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Uzmetal Technology appeared to be a great success—only to 
plummet into bankruptcy after the government of Uzbekistan filed 
criminal charges against the company’s officers. Uzmetal was a joint 
venture between an Israeli metal manufacturer later known as Metal-
Tech and two Uzbek government-owned companies, Almalik Mining 
Metallurgy Combinate (AGMK) and the Uzbek Refractory and 
Resistant Metals Integrated Plant (UzKTJM). Just as the young 
partnership began to turn a profit, however, the Uzbek government 
accused it of violating several criminal laws. The venture’s 
shareholders commenced involuntary bankruptcy proceedings, 
ultimately forcing the company to liquidate. When the Israeli 
investor’s claims in bankruptcy were denied, the investor sought 
compensation in arbitration. Sensing impropriety, the tribunal 
requested discovery regarding millions of dollars in consulting 
payments. The tribunal ultimately concluded that those payments 
were nothing more than thinly disguised bribes. As a result, the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) 
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tribunal in Metal-Tech v. Uzbekistan1 rejected the investor’s claim. 
This marked only the second time in ICSID history that a tribunal has 
rejected a claim due to bribery, and the first time a tribunal has done 
so for a treaty claim. 
This Essay examines Metal-Tech’s treatment of corruption, 
building upon the analytical structure set forth in this author’s 2014 
Note, Streamlining the Corruption Defense.2 That Note’s framework 
for analyzing ICSID awards involving allegations of corruption 
proves useful for examining the Metal-Tech award. Implementing that 
framework, this Essay concludes that the standard of proof applied by 
the tribunal represents a departure from prior ICSID jurisprudence. 
It also questions whether an application of comparative fault 
principles could have achieved a more just result. Finally, this Essay 
argues that the tribunal could have resolved some lingering questions 
by staying the proceedings pending the outcome of Uzbekistan’s 
domestic corruption investigation. 
Part I herein sets forth the facts underlying the dispute. Part II 
analyzes the distinctive aspects of the award and the tribunal’s 
reasoning. Finally, Part III examines distinctive features of the award 
and assesses the award’s implications for future ICSID claims tainted 
by bribery. 
I.  ORIGINS OF THE DISPUTE 
In 1998, Metal-Tech began negotiations with the government of 
Uzbekistan regarding the formation of a partnership to modernize 
the Uzbek molybdenum3 industry.4 Uzbekistan had been home to a 
 
 1. Metal-Tech Ltd. v. Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3, Award (Oct. 4, 
2013), http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3012.pdf. 
 2. Michael A. Losco, Note, Streamlining the Corruption Defense: A Proposed Framework 
for FCPA-ICSID Interaction, 63 DUKE L.J. 1201 (2014).  For a recent and thorough overview of 
investment treaty arbitration cases dealing with corruption, see generally Carolyn B. Lamm, 
Brody K. Greenwald & Kristen M. Young, From World Duty Free to Metal-Tech: A Review of 
International Investment Treaty Arbitration Cases Involving Allegations of Corruption, 29 ICSID 
REV. 328 (2014). 
 3. Molybdenum is a “metallic element used to enhance the strength, durability, and 
corrosion resistance of steel, cast iron, and superalloys.” Metal-Tech, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/10/3, Award, ¶ 1 n.2. “The versatility of molybdenum in enhancing a variety of alloy 
properties has ensured it a significant role in contemporary industrial technology, which 
increasingly requires materials that are serviceable under high stress, expanded temperature 
ranges, and highly corrosive environments . . . . Few of molybdenum’s uses have acceptable 
substitutes.” Molybdenum Statistics and Information, USGS MINERALS INFO., 
http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/molybdenum (last visited Oct. 23, 2014). 
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flourishing molybdenum industry in the 1980s, but the sector had 
fared poorly since the collapse of the Soviet Union. AGMK, 
Uzbekistan’s only molybdenum-mining company, used such outdated 
technology that it was unable to produce molybdenum concentrate of 
acceptable quality for sale on the global market. Its extraction process 
was both dirty and inefficient. Unable to export its products, 
AGMK’s sales were confined to a sole local customer, UzKTJM. 
UzKTJM was Uzbekistan’s “primary producer and exporter of 
molybdenum products,” but the low quality of AGMK’s concentrate 
prevented UzKTJM from producing high-quality export products.5 
UzKTJM therefore utilized only a fraction of its capacity, and by 1998 
it was operating at a loss and falling into debt. Both of these 
struggling entities were owned by the government of Uzbekistan. 
In January 2000, after conducting a feasibility study and 
receiving authorization from the Uzbek Cabinet of Ministers, Metal-
Tech and the Uzbek companies established the joint venture Uzmetal 
Technology. Metal-Tech would “contribute its technology, know-how 
and access to international markets as well as part of the financing 
needed for a new plant”;6 AGMK and UzKTJM would contribute 
buildings, equipment, and raw materials. Metal-Tech would act as a 
middleman for the venture, purchasing all of Uzmetal’s products and 
selling them on the global market.7 Metal-Tech was to receive a 50 
percent stake in the venture in exchange for a capital contribution of 
$500,000.8 The total value of the project was expected to exceed $19 
million. 
Uzmetal’s facilities opened in October 2002, and by 2005 the 
venture was turning a profit. In May 2006, Uzmetal’s General 
Meeting of Participants decided to distribute dividends. But less than 
a month later, the Public Prosecutor’s Office for the Tashkent Region 
initiated criminal proceedings “on the ground that officials of 
Uzmetal had abused their authority and caused harm to 
Uzbekistan.”9 Uzbekistan’s Cabinet of Ministers adopted a resolution 
abrogating Uzmetal’s rights to purchase raw materials and, according 
 
 4. Metal-Tech, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3, Award, ¶ 7. At the time, Metal-Tech was 
known as Metek Metal Technology, Ltd. Id. ¶ 1 n.1. 
 5. Id. ¶ 7. 
 6. Id. ¶ 10. 
 7. Id. ¶ 27. 
 8. Id. ¶ 15. 
 9. Id. ¶ 37. 
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to Metal-Tech, “cancel[ing] its exclusive right to export Uzmetal’s 
refined molybdenum oxide.”10 
A frenzy of legal proceedings followed. UzKTJM sued to enforce 
distribution of its share of the May 2006 dividends, which alone 
amounted to over $162 million. On the same day, Uzmetal brought 
suit to invalidate the decision to distribute dividends, but the 
Tashkent District Economic Court dismissed Uzmetal’s claim. Days 
later, “UzKTJM initiated bankruptcy proceedings against Uzmetal on 
the basis of Uzmetal’s failure to pay the dividends.”11 The court 
placed Uzmetal in bankruptcy under the supervision of a temporary 
manager, who rejected Metal-Tech’s bankruptcy claims. 
Consequently, AGMK and UzKTJM, as the only recognized creditors 
of Uzmetal, met and voted to liquidate the venture. On January 14, 
2008, less than five months after the beginning of bankruptcy 
proceedings, the Uzbek Court of Cassation initiated the liquidation of 
Uzmetal. Those proceedings lasted until late 2009; that December, 
“Uzmetal was delisted from the state registry of legal entities.”12 
II.  THE AWARD 
This Part begins by reviewing the important procedural aspects 
of the arbitration. It then outlines the arguments of the parties, and it 
concludes by explaining the tribunal’s decision and reasoning. 
A. Arbitration Proceedings 
On January 26, 2010, Metal-Tech submitted a Request for 
Arbitration to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes, pursuant to the consent given in Article 8 of the Israel-
Uzbekistan Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT).13 Metal-Tech sought 
declarations that Uzbekistan had breached international law, Uzbek 
law, and certain provisions of the Israel-Uzbekistan BIT by failing to 
accord its investment fair and equitable treatment, failing to provide 
full and constant protection and security, and by expropriating the 
investment without due process of law and without payment of 
 
 10. Id. ¶ 38. 
 11. Id. ¶ 46. 
 12. Id. ¶ 53. 
 13. For more information about the ICSID, the requirement of consent to ICSID 
arbitration, and bilateral investment treaties, see Losco, supra note 2, at 1205–09. 
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prompt, adequate, and effective compensation.14 It sought 
compensation of approximately $174 million.15 
Prior to the January 2012 hearing on jurisdiction and liability, 
Uzbekistan notified the tribunal that the Uzbek Prosecutor General 
had commenced an investigation into Uzmetal’s participation in a 
criminal enterprise involving kickbacks to Uzbek government 
officials.16 At the January hearing, Metal-Tech’s chairman, Ariel 
Rosenberg, revealed that Metal-Tech had made payments totaling 
approximately $4 million to several consultants for “lobbyist activity” 
under consulting agreements dating back to 1998.17 This revelation 
directly contradicted previously submitted evidence indicating that 
the consultants were hired in 2005 “for assistance with Uzmetal’s day-
to-day operations.”18 Feeling it had a “duty to inquire,”19 the tribunal 
ordered further discovery regarding the consulting payments 
pursuant to its authority under Article 43 of the ICSID Convention.20 
The tribunal observed that the evidence raised a number of 
internationally accepted “red flags” for corruption.21 These red flags 
included the size of the payments made to the consultants; the lack of 
proof that the consultants provided any legitimate services; the 
consultants’ lack of qualifications or experience in the sector; their 
connections with public officials in charge of the investment; and the 
conclusion of sham contracts with mysterious foreign entities 
“designed to conceal the true nature of the relationship among the 
parties.”22 
The consulting payments, which amounted to nearly 20 percent 
of the entire project cost, exceeded Metal-Tech’s initial cash 
contribution to the joint venture and far exceeded local salaries.23 The 
 
 14. Metal-Tech, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3, Award, ¶ 55. 
 15. Id. ¶ 108. 
 16. Id. ¶ 76. 
 17. Id. ¶ 86. 
 18. Sebastian Perry, Uzbek claim dismissed because of corruption, GLOBAL ARB. REV. 
(Nov. 26, 2013), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/32072/uzbek-claim-dismissed-
corruption; Metal-Tech, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3, Award, ¶ 86.  
 19. Metal-Tech, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3, Award, ¶ 241. 
 20. Id. ¶¶ 86, 92; see Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States 
and Nationals of Other States, art. 43, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 
U.N.T.S. 159. 
 21. Metal-Tech, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3, Award, ¶ 293. 
 22. Id. ¶ 218. 
 23. Id. ¶ 199. One of the consultants received a salary of $100 per month from Uzmetal yet 
received a $5,000 per month “bonus” from Metal-Tech. Id. ¶ 200. 
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consulting contracts required that the consultants be paid regardless 
of the services they rendered,24 and Metal-Tech repeatedly failed to 
provide evidence of the services provided in exchange for their 
“substantial compensation.”25 None of the consultants possessed any 
professional qualification for the services they were supposedly hired 
to perform, and none had any experience in the molybdenum 
industry.26 These “consultants” included a retired police investigator 
who happened to be the brother of the Uzbek prime minister,27 a 
pharmaceutical scientist and newspaper manager,28 and a human 
resources functionary in the office of the president of Uzbekistan.29 
Moreover, the vast majority of payments were made indirectly, 
through opaque Swiss and British Virgin Islands holding companies 
owned by the consultants, rather than directly to the consultants 
themselves.30 
B. Arguments of the Parties 
Uzbekistan objected to the tribunal’s exercise of jurisdiction, 
alleging that Metal-Tech had “engaged in corruption and made 
fraudulent and material misrepresentations to gain approval for its 
investment.”31 The Israel-Uzbekistan BIT contained a legality 
provision requiring that a covered investment be implemented in 
accordance with the laws of the host state; Uzbek law made it a crime 
to give or receive a bribe, directly or through an intermediary.32 
Because Metal-Tech had engaged in corruption at the time of the 
procurement of the contract, it argued, the investment had been 
“implemented” in violation of Uzbek law, negating Uzbekistan’s 
consent to arbitration.33 
Metal-Tech argued that the definition of “implemented” 
required that the investment be made, not operated, in violation of 
host state law in order to defeat jurisdiction.34 It argued that the 
 
 24. Id. ¶ 204. 
 25. Id. ¶ 207. 
 26. Id. ¶ 208. 
 27. Id. ¶¶ 210, 226. 
 28. Id. ¶ 212. 
 29. Id. ¶ 209. 
 30. Id. ¶¶ 219–224. 
 31. Id. ¶ 110. 
 32. Id. ¶ 282. 
 33. Id. ¶¶ 110, 372–373. 
 34. Id. ¶¶ 176, 180. 
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investment had not been made in violation of Uzbek law, meaning 
that Metal-Tech had not violated the legality requirement and that 
therefore Uzbekistan’s consent to arbitration remained valid. Metal-
Tech further argued that the BIT’s most favored nation (MFN) 
provision required that the tribunal incorporate the more favorable 
definition of “investment” contained in the Greece-Uzbekistan BIT, 
which did not include a legality requirement.35 
C. The Tribunal’s Decision and Reasoning 
The tribunal concluded that the word “implemented” in Article 
1(1) of the BIT meant that an investment must be established in 
accordance with the laws of its host state, but that the provision was 
silent on whether it must also be operated in accordance with law.36 
The tribunal also concluded that, absent agreement by the parties to 
the contrary, the MFN clause did not permit importation of a more 
favorable definition of investment because the terms “investment” 
and “investor” were used in the MFN provision itself.37 A claimant 
must first have an investment “under the treaty to claim through the 
treaty.”38 
Because the BIT was silent with respect to presumptions, burden 
shifting, and inferences to be drawn from a lack of evidence, the 
tribunal determined that it had “relative freedom in determining the 
standard necessary to sustain a determination of corruption.”39 
Applying the widely recognized international standard that each 
party bears the burden of proving the facts on which it relies, the 
tribunal inquired whether corruption had been established with 
“reasonable certainty.”40 It declared that because corruption is 
difficult to establish, it can be proved through circumstantial 
evidence.41 Without asserting that Uzbekistan had established the 
existence of corruption prima facie, the tribunal noted that the facts 
did establish suspicions of corruption.42 It therefore required 
explanations regarding those suspicions.43 Moreover, it would draw 
 
 35. Id. ¶¶ 132, 135. 
 36. Id. ¶ 185. 
 37. Id. ¶¶ 144–145. 
 38. Id. ¶ 145. 
 39. Id. ¶¶ 237–238. 
 40. Id. ¶ 243. 
 41. Id.  
 42. Id. ¶ 239. 
 43. Id. 
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appropriate inferences against Metal-Tech for its failure to produce 
evidence that it had been ordered to produce.44 
Because Metal-Tech was unable to rebut the suspicions of illicit 
conduct, the tribunal concluded that Metal-Tech had engaged in 
corruption in violation of Uzbek law.45 Accordingly, it determined 
that the investment had not been implemented in accordance with the 
laws of the host state as required by Article 1(1) of the BIT.46 
Uzbekistan’s consent to arbitration in Article 8(1) of the BIT 
therefore did not apply to claims arising from the joint venture, and 
the tribunal could not assert jurisdiction over the dispute.47 As a result 
of its inability to assert jurisdiction over Metal-Tech’s claims, it also 
lacked jurisdiction over Uzbekistan’s counterclaims.48 
Noting that it had discretion to allocate costs, the tribunal 
ordered the parties to bear their own expenses and to split the fees 
charged by ICSID.49 It observed that the presence of corruption had 
deprived Metal-Tech of protection and relieved Uzbekistan of any 
liability.50 However, Uzbekistan had participated in the same 
corruption that allowed it to escape liability.51 Indeed, such 
participation “is implicit in the very nature of corruption.”52 It was 
therefore fair, the tribunal reasoned, for the parties to share the costs 
of the arbitration.53 
III.  MAKING SENSE OF METAL-TECH 
How does the Metal-Tech tribunal’s reasoning compare to that of 
past tribunals? What are the implications of the tribunal’s decision, 
and what could it have done differently? This Part begins by 
examining the significant attributes of the award with a view to 
assessing how it resembles and differs from previous ICSID 
jurisprudence. Next, this Part compares the evidentiary burden and 
standard of proof applied by the tribunal to the standards applied by 
 
 44. Id. ¶ 245. 
 45. Id. ¶¶ 239, 372, 390. 
 46. Id. ¶ 373. 
 47. Id. ¶¶ 239, 372, 390. 
 48. Id. ¶ 413. 
 49. Id. ¶ 423. 
 50. Id. ¶ 422. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
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past tribunals. It notes that Metal-Tech’s application of a relatively 
low standard of proof, combined with a reliance on circumstantial 
evidence and a willingness to shift the burden of proof to the 
claimant, marks a shift away from the evidentiary approaches used by 
other ICSID tribunals. Next, this Part observes that lingering 
questions remain about the true nature of the corruption at play. It 
concludes by arguing that these questions could have been resolved if 
the parties and tribunal had been willing to wait for evidence 
uncovered by a domestic investigation. 
Streamlining the Corruption Defense identifies four legal 
attributes that are relevant to evaluating the treatment of corruption 
in ICSID arbitration. These include: (1) the nature of the wrongful 
conduct; (2) the law applied by the tribunal; (3) the evidentiary 
burden and standard of proof; and (4) the remedy afforded to the 
claimant.54 Together, these attributes provide a useful conceptual 
framework for analyzing the Metal-Tech award. 
First, as noted by the tribunal, Metal-Tech’s consulting payments 
constituted mutual corruption in the procurement of the investment. 
It is not apparent, however, whether they were “soft” or “hard” in 
character because it is unclear how the funds paid to the consultants 
were ultimately used. At least one of the consultants was a public 
official himself, but he seems not to have had direct authority over 
the approval of the project. If the consultants retained the funds 
themselves in exchange for exerting undue influence on public 
officials, the payments would constitute “soft” corruption.55 
Alternatively, if they funneled some of the funds to public officials as 
bribes, the payments would constitute “hard” corruption.56 
Second, the Metal-Tech tribunal’s decision was based on the 
legality of the investment (accordance with laws), as opposed to an 
international or transnational public policy, or good faith. Taking a 
minimalist approach, the tribunal declined to apply the concept of 
international public policy to the case at hand because it would be 
unnecessary to do so after having determining that it lacked 
jurisdiction to hear the case.57 
Third, the tribunal assessed the evidence of corruption under a 
“reasonable certainty” standard, drawing inferences from 
 
 54. For an explanation of each of these characteristics, see Losco, supra note 2, at 1218–31. 
 55. See Losco, supra note 2, at 1220. 
 56. See id. at 1220–21. 
 57. Metal-Tech, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3, Award, ¶ 374. 
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circumstantial evidence. It declared that the “factual matrix d[id] not 
require the tribunal to resort to presumptions or rules of burden of 
proof.”58 
Finally, the remedy was jurisdictional in nature. Metal-Tech’s 
failure to implement its investment in accordance with Uzbek law 
negated Uzbekistan’s consent to arbitration, and as a result the 
tribunal could not claim jurisdiction over the dispute. 
Neither the nature of the wrongful conduct, nor the law applied 
by the tribunal, nor the remedy applied differed significantly from the 
experience of prior ICSID tribunals. This Essay will proceed by 
analyzing the attribute that stands out most from prior ICSID 
jurisprudence: the tribunal’s novel approach to assessing the evidence 
of corruption. 
A. A New Course: Standard of Proof and ICSID Jurisprudence 
Metal-Tech is the first ICSID decision to deny an investor’s BIT 
claim due to bribery.59 In this respect, the award is important because 
it suggests a new approach for dealing with bribery in BIT claims. 
One particularly interesting aspect of the award is its approach to the 
standard of proof for corruption claims. The tribunal noted that 
although it was “not bound by previous decisions of ICSID or other 
arbitral tribunals,” it should pay those decisions “due regard.”60 It 
further noted that, absent “compelling reasons to the contrary,” it had 
a “duty to follow solutions” consistently established in comparable 
cases.61 Yet the tribunal embarked down its own path while creatively 
construing existing ICSID jurisprudence to give the impression that it 
was following in the footsteps of prior tribunals. 
ICSID tribunals have generally applied high standards of proof 
to corruption allegations.62 Metal-Tech marks a departure from this 
chain of ICSID jurisprudence. Siag v. Egypt63 applied a “clear and 
 
 58. Id. ¶ 243. 
 59. See Lamm et al., supra note 2, at 329; Losco, supra note 2, at 1219. 
 60. Metal-Tech, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3, Award, ¶ 116. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Losco, supra note 2, at 1228–30; see also Florian Haugeneder & Christoph Liebscher, 
Corruption and Investment Arbitration: Substantive Standards and Proof, in AUSTRIAN 
ARBITRATION YEARBOOK 2009, at 538, 555–56 (Christian Klausegger et al. eds., 2009) 
(“Establishing corruption is, as a matter of fact, difficult.”). 
 63. Siag v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15, Award (June 1, 2009), 
http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0786_0.pdf. 
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convincing evidence” standard,64 over the dissent of arbitrator 
Francisco Orrego Vicuña, who argued for the application of a lower 
standard permitting the tribunal discretion to make inferences from 
“concordant circumstantial evidence.”65 Other tribunals have applied 
a high burden of proof but have declined to define the precise 
burden.66 
Metal-Tech, on the other hand, applied a standard of “reasonable 
certainty.”67 The tribunal noted that because corruption is difficult to 
establish, it is “generally admitted that it can be shown through 
circumstantial evidence.”68 In support of this proposition, the tribunal 
cited the 2012 Oostergetel69 award—an arbitration under the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) 
Rules. Oostergetel in turn cited a third award, Rumeli Telekom,70 for 
the proposition that corruption can be proven by circumstantial 
evidence.71 However, the Oostergetel tribunal found that such 
evidence was entirely lacking in the case before it.72 The Rumeli 
tribunal, dealing with allegations of conspiracy rather than bribery, 
concluded that because direct evidence of a conspiracy is unlikely to 
be available, circumstantial evidence may suffice to support such an 
allegation—but only if that evidence “leads clearly and convincingly 
to the inference that a conspiracy has occurred.”73 
 
 64. Id. ¶ 326. 
 65. Siag, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15, Award, Dissenting Opinion of Professor Francisco 
Orrego Vicuña at 4 (quoting ABDULHAY SAYED, CORRUPTION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
AND COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 93–94 (2004)). 
 66. TSA Spectrum de Argentina S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/5, 
Award, ¶¶ 172–175 (Dec. 19, 2008), 48 I.L.M. 496 (2009); Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of 
Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Award, ¶ 111 (Dec. 8, 2000), 41 I.L.M. 896 (2002). See 
generally Losco, supra note 2, at 1229–30 & nn.209–11 (contrasting the “clear and convincing 
evidence” standard of Siag with the undefined standards applied by other tribunals). 
 67. Metal-Tech Ltd. v. Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3, Award, ¶ 243 
(Oct. 4, 2013), http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3012.pdf. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Oostergetel v. Slovak Republic, Final Award, ¶ 303 (Apr. 23, 2012), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0933.pdf. It is interesting to note 
that Professor Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler presided over both the Metal-Tech and Oostergetel 
tribunals. Id. 
 70. Rumeli Telekom A.S. v. Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/16, Award, 
¶ 709 (July 29, 2008), http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0728.pdf. 
 71. Oostergetel, Final Award, ¶ 303.  
 72. Id. 
 73. Rumeli Telekom, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/16, Award, ¶ 709. 
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Here, the tribunal seems to have followed the approach 
advocated by Orrego Vicuña, admitting the difficulty of proving 
corruption and basing its conclusion on evidence adduced by 
Uzbekistan combined with Metal-Tech’s inability to explain away the 
resulting “suspicions.”74 Though commercial arbitration tribunals 
have occasionally deployed similar reasoning,75 Metal-Tech is the first 
ICSID tribunal to find the existence of corruption using this 
strategy.76 Whether this burden-shifting approach catches on among 
future ICSID tribunals will likely depend on the peculiar facts of 
future cases and the weight future tribunals accord to Metal-Tech’s 
reasoning.77 
B. A Blunt Remedy 
Metal-Tech demonstrated that resolution of corruption 
allegations at the jurisdictional stage is a blunt remedy. Here, the 
division of costs seems to be a signal that the tribunal perceived 
inequity in the result. Uzbekistan was able to invoke Metal-Tech’s 
corrupt conduct as an absolute bar to its own liability, even though at 
least one Uzbek official took part in that conduct. The tribunal 
therefore sought to levy some penalty on the host state for its 
complicity in the corrupt activity; unable to exercise jurisdiction over 
the merits of the dispute, the tribunal had to use its only remaining 
tool—costs—to do so. 
But Uzbekistan suffered another penalty for its complicity in the 
corrupt conduct before the Metal-Tech tribunal. Because the tribunal 
could not assert jurisdiction, it rejected Uzbekistan’s counterclaims 
against Metal-Tech. Lacking jurisdiction over the dispute, the tribunal 
was unable to adjudicate the claims of either party. The loss of 
counterclaims is a significant attribute of the outcome, especially 
considering that Peru recently settled three claims against investors 
for $40 million.
78
 States may be less inclined to taint investments with 
corrupt conduct if investment arbitration is a two-way street. In other 
 
 74.  Metal-Tech, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3, Award, ¶¶ 239, 372. 
 75. Haugeneder & Liebscher, supra note 62, at 552–55. 
 76. See Losco, supra note 2, at 1219. 
 77. See Haugeneder & Liebscher, supra note 62, at 555–56 (“[E]valuation of evidence is 
more important than the abstract definition of the applied standard.”). 
 78. Peru settles trio of power line claims, GLOBAL ARB. REV. (Mar. 28, 2014), 
http://globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/32533/peru-settles-trio-power-line-claims. 
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words, states can utilize investment arbitration as a forum to recover 
for harm suffered due to investors’ conduct. 
Perhaps even more potent than the loss of counterclaims are the 
reputational effects of a corruption finding. As one commentator has 
observed, it may well signal “game over” for corrupt host countries.
79
 
The increasing frequency and visibility of investor-state arbitrations
80
 
suggests that the availability of this forum has become an important 
consideration for investors. Some evidence suggests that corruption 
matters to investors.
81
 A robust corruption defense should elevate the 
importance of corruption relative to the quality of host state 
institutions, since corruption can deprive investors of an important 
forum for dispute resolution. By giving investors something to lose, 
we should expect to see the correlation between corruption and 
reduced inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) become even 
stronger. 
As noted in Streamlining the Corruption Defense, recognizing a 
comparative fault standard for corruption might be another way to 
penalize the host state for its complicity.
82
 In cases like Metal-Tech 
where the remedy is jurisdictional, however, a tribunal would have no 
legal basis for applying such a standard. Before awarding damages 
according to relative culpability, the tribunal would have to create a 
legal fiction in order to assert jurisdiction. This would be tantamount 
to an exercise of the tribunal’s power ex aequo et bono,
83
 which 
requires the consent of the parties. To do so without the parties’ 
consent would constitute an excess of powers and potentially a failure 
to state the reasons on which the award is based, both of which are 
grounds for annulment of the award.
84 
 
 79. Tamar Meshel, Metal-Tech Ltd. v. Republic of Uzbekistan – ‘Strike Two’ Against 
Investor Claimants Facing the Corruption Defense, INTLAWGRRLS (Dec. 18, 2013), 
http://ilg2.org/2013/12/18/metal-tech-ltd-v-republic-of-uzbekistan-strike-two-against-investor-
claimants-facing-the-corruption-defense/. 
 80. U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., Investor–State Disputes: Prevention and 
Alternatives to Arbitration 4, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2009/11 (2010). 
 81. Ali Al-Sadig, Effects of Corruption on FDI Inflows, 29 CATO J. 267, 289 (2009), 
available at http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-journal/2009/5/cj29n2-4.pdf. 
 82. Losco, supra note 2, at 1219–20. 
 83. The power to decide disputes ex aequo et bono “free[s] the decision-maker from the 
rigidities of positive law” and “permit[s] considerations of equity, justice and fairness.” 
Christoph Schreuer, Decisions Ex Aequo et Bono Under the ICSID Convention, 11 ICSID REV. 
37, 37 (1996), available at http://icsidreview.oxfordjournals.org/content/11/1/37.full.pdf. 
 84. Id. at 53. 
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C. A Better Approach? 
The Metal-Tech tribunal proved itself adept at uncovering 
corruption by shifting the evidentiary burden to the claimant and 
according substantial weight to circumstantial evidence. However, 
Uzbek domestic law enforcement authorities played an indispensable 
role in the case. The tribunal never would have been alerted to the 
presence of corruption if not for the intervention of domestic 
authorities. Even after the issuance of the award, lingering questions 
remain regarding the true nature of the parties’ corrupt conduct. 
Because the parties produced limited evidence of corruption,85 we do 
not know how the funds paid to the consultants were ultimately used. 
Were they were retained by the consultants themselves in exchange 
for exerting undue influence on public officials, or were some of the 
funds funneled to public officials as bribes? If the tribunal had stayed 
the case pending the outcome of a domestic investigation, it could 
have directed Uzbekistan to produce the records of that investigation. 
Streamlining the Corruption Defense advocates precisely such a 
strategy.86 Unlike claimants, who may refuse to cooperate even when 
a tribunal orders the production of evidence,87 respondent states have 
an incentive to uncover and produce evidence of corruption. Though 
the tribunal here proved adept at uncovering corrupt conduct, state 
law enforcement authorities likely have greater ability to gather 
evidence than an arbitral tribunal. Though this might raise concerns 
about incentivizing badly behaved host states to abuse their authority, 
it would ensure the availability of the best evidence possible. The 
tribunal would retain discretion to decide on the admissibility and 
weight of that evidence. It could discount, or refuse to recognize 
altogether, evidence gathered in an unfair or abusive fashion. Parties 
and tribunals would simply need to assess whether the potential for 
enhanced accuracy is worth the delay. 
 
 85. The tribunal’s finding of corruption was based in large part on the testimony of one 
witness, Metal-Tech’s chairman Ariel Rosenberg. “[T]he Claimant did not proffer any witness 
(other than Mr. Rosenberg) in support of its submission that legitimate services were rendered 
by the Consultants.” Metal-Tech Ltd. v. Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3, 
Award, ¶ 263 (Oct. 4, 2013), http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3012.pdf. 
Uzbekistan’s only oral testimony came from one of Metal-Tech’s paid consultants, who was in 
Uzbek prison and admitted to cooperating in hopes that he might receive a reduction in his 
sentence. As a result, the tribunal did not accord any weight to his testimony. Uzbekistan did 
not allege corruption on the part of its witness. Id. ¶¶ 365–366.  
 86. Losco, supra note 2, at 1239–41. 
 87. Haugeneder & Liebscher, supra note 62, at 556. 
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CONCLUSION 
Metal-Tech is a significant development in ICSID corruption 
jurisprudence, applying a novel standard of proof to evidence of 
corruption. To be clear, Metal-Tech is not a complete departure from 
the accepted rules or practice regarding evidence in international 
arbitration. But it does mark a new approach to allegations of 
corruption in ICSID arbitration. The award also demonstrated that 
declining jurisdiction is a blunt remedy. Because reputational 
consequences are not immediately visible at the time an award is 
rendered, dismissing claims due to corruption may, as here, be an 
unpalatable decision for arbitrators. The loss of the host state’s 
counterclaims is more readily apparent, but the strength of that 
incentive depends in large part on the underlying facts of the specific 
investment. Still, tribunals should not underestimate the reputational 
effects of a corruption finding. 
Moreover, the outcome of the dispute hinged on the tribunal’s 
interpretation of the BIT’s legality requirement and of Uzbek 
anticorruption law. However, treaty provisions and domestic 
anticorruption laws differ by country. If Uzbekistan had no 
corruption law at all, for example, its consent to arbitration would 
have remained valid despite the existence of a legality requirement in 
the BIT. Would the tribunal have invoked principles of good faith or 
international public policy as a backstop? If the BIT lacked an 
explicit legality requirement, would the tribunal have found one to be 
implied?88 These are questions that future ICSID tribunals may be 
called upon to address. 
The Metal-Tech tribunal’s decision also left some lingering 
questions about the nature of the corruption at play. Who were the 
ultimate recipients of the consulting payments? How many 
government officials were involved, and how high-ranking were they? 
Given the bluntness of the jurisdictional remedy, the answers to 
questions like these will impact our notions about the fairness of the 
results in cases involving allegations of corruption. Tribunals will have 
a better chance of formulating these answers if they enlist the 
investigative capabilities of host states. Finally, it remains to be seen 
whether future ICSID tribunals will follow Metal-Tech’s lead or 
whether they will apply higher standards of proof, as past tribunals 
 
 88. Uzbekistan raised precisely this argument, Metal-Tech, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3, 
Award, ¶ 110, but the tribunal declined to address it. Id. ¶ 163. 
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have done. At the very least, Metal-Tech demonstrates that 
corruption in the formation of an investment will continue to act as a 
bar to recovery for claimants. 
 
